Mapping Global Expansion of Chinese-speaking Scam Syndicates, 2010–2026
Humanity Research Consultancy | A chronological overview of the evolution of Chinese-speaking scam syndicates exposes the transformation and geographic reach of their operations.
While current news coverage focuses on the shift from Southeast Asia to avoid ongoing crackdowns, the report details scam operations dating back to 2010 and traces the use of forced criminality since at least 2015.
Prior to 2020 and the pandemic, scam syndicates used predominantly Chinese-speaking workers to target victims in China, Taiwan, and the Chinese diaspora. Post-pandemic, their efforts broadened to target scam victims worldwide, using a wider range of scam methods and workers from at least 80 countries, including both voluntary workers and trafficked victims.
The report highlights three key areas:
Overseas expansion of Chinese-speaking scam operations is not new. As early as 2017, the Chinese government claimed that it had identified scam operations established by Taiwanese and Chinese nationals in at least 40 countries, primarily targeting Chinese-speaking victims.
Recent developments go beyond geographic expansion. Most documented overseas operations follow an “outpost” led by a single leadership team, rather than the purpose-built industrial park model of compounds housing multiple scam “companies.” Outpost models are smaller and harder to detect, but easier to shut down. Compounds are more visible, more complex, and often benefit from corruption in the areas where they operate. Evidence suggests that criminal groups are working to implement the compound ecosystem in more countries.
More research is needed to clarify the use of different locations over time. For example, more information is needed to determine whether criminal groups have moved away from some pre-pandemic areas or have become better at avoiding detection. While early operations were identified through multinational investigations, later investigations tend to be more locally based.
This report includes a high-level analysis, followed by country profiles and specific case details covering 45 countries. For example:
Croatia: Police arrested Taiwanese nationals accused of running a fraud network targeting Chinese citizens in 2018. They allege that the ringleaders recruited workers from Taiwan, then took their passports and forced them to target victims in China with police-impersonation scams.
UAE: Scam operators have been advertising scam-related positions on Chinese-language Telegram channels since at least 2022. In 2024, HRC identified at least seven suspected compounds across Dubai and Ajman. Evidence suggests Chinese-speaking groups ran them and managed them similarly to compounds in Cambodia and Myanmar.
United Kingdom: In 2024, authorities raided a Chinese-operated scam network in the Isle of Man as part of a broader investigation. Documents show that the operators had transferred workers from the Philippines to Isle of Man in 2021 to target victims in China.
Sri Lanka: Authorities arrested 200 foreign nationals, mostly from India, connected to online financial scams in May 2024. In October, they arrested more than 230 Chinese nationals and seized hundreds of computers and mobile phones in raids targeting cyber-scam operations.
Pakistan: Following a 2026 raid on an illegal scam call center based in a luxury residential compound near Islamabad, apparent testimony from a worker suggests that the operation had been moved from Sihanoukville, Cambodia, in 2025. Because the company held their passports, workers had no choice but to relocate.
Regions include Africa, the Americas, Europe, Oceania, and Southeast Asia, East Asia, West Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia.
Read the overview and download the report: The Scam Compounds Brief Special Issue: Mapping the Global Expansion of Chinese-speaking Scam Syndicates, 2010–2026
